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Abstract 
                           In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium  
                           in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then 
                           by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence  
                           theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly  
                           model of price competition.   
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1. Introduction and Preliminaries 
 
1.1. Definitions and notations in game theory 
In begin of this section, we review some concepts and notations in game theory that are used by 
many authors. The readers are referred to [1], [67], [1014] for more details. Let n be a 
positive integer greater than 1. An n-person noncooperative strategic game, simply called an n-
person game, consists of the following elements: 
1. the set of n players denoted by N with N = n; 
2. the set of profiles SN = iN Si, where Si is the pure strategy set for player i  N; 
3. the utility vector mapping f  = iN fi: SN  Rn, where fi is the utility (payoff) function of 
player i, for i  N. 
 
This game is denoted by G(N, SN, f). Throughout this paper, we always assume that, in the 
products iN Si, iN fi and kN\{i} Sk, the players appear in the same sequential orders. As 
usual, for every i  N, we often denote a profile of pure strategies for player i’s opponents by 
                                                     xi = (x1, x2, …, xi 1, xi +1, xn). 
The set of profiles of pure strategies for player i’s opponents is then denoted by 
                                                                Si = kN\{i} Sk.  
Hence we may write x  SN as  
                                                  x = (xi, xi) with xi   Si, for i  N.                                          (1) 
Moreover, for every xi   Si, we denote  
                                                        fi(Si, xi) = {fi(zi, xi): zi  Si}. 
From f = iN fi in the game G(N, SN, f), for any x  S, we have 
                                                                  f(x) = iN fi(x).                                                           
One of the most important topics in game theory is the study of Nash equilibrium problems. It 
has been widely studied by many authors and has been extensively applied to economic theory, 
business and related industries (see [1], [7], [1014]).  We recall the definition of Nash 
equilibrium in n-person noncooperative strategic games below. 
Let G(N, SN, f) be an n-person game. A profile of pure strategies x

= ( 1x

, 2x

, …, nx

)  SN is a 
Nash equilibrium of this game if and only if, it satisfies 
                                      fi(zi, ix

)  fi( ix

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), for every i  N and for every zi  Si,                     (2) 
It can be rewritten as 
                                     fi(zi, ix

)  fi( ix

, ix

), for every i  N and for every z  SN.                       
In an n-person game G(N, SN, f), we define a mapping F: SNSN  Rn by 
                                                 F(z, x) = iN fi(zi, xi), for any x, z  SN.                                    (3)                      
F(z, x) is called the utility vector at profile x  SN associated to z  SN.  It is clearly to see 
                                                              F(x, x) = f(x), any x  SN.                                                (4)                                                
Let n be the component-wise partial order on Rn satisfying that, for x, z  SN, 
                            F(z, x) n F(x, x) = f(x), if and only if,  fi(zi, xi)  fi(xi, xi), for all i  N.       (5)  
From (25), the Nash equilibrium can be rewritten by: a profile x SN is a Nash equilibrium of 
G(N, SN, f) if and only if, 
                                                  F(z, x

) n F( x , x ) = f( x ), for all z  SN.                                     (6) 
1.2. n-person dual games 
An n-person game G = (N, SN, f) is static. Some games in the real world may not be static. That 
is, it may not be one-shot nature. It is more realistic for this game to be repeatedly played. The 
dynamic model of game based on an n-person game G = (N, SN, f) is formulized by the process 
that this static game is repeated infinite periods (times). It is called an n-person repeated game, in 
which there is a discount factor involved for the utilities (see [10]). The dynamic model for n-
person repeated games will be studied in section 3 
In this paper, we first consider a special model: n-person dual game. An n-person dual game 
based on an n-person game G(N, SN, f) is modeled as follows: At first, the players play the game 
as a static n-person noncooperative strategic game. After this game is played first time and 
before this game is played again, every player always considers the reaction of its competitors to 
its strategy applied in the first time. To seek the optimization of the player’s utilities, the players 
may make arrangements of strategies to use in the second play. Suppose that this performance is 
represented by a mapping A on SN. Hence, if x  SN is the profile used by the players in the first 
time, then Ax  SN will be the profile used by the players in the second time. This n-person dual 
game is denoted by G(N, SN, f, A)
2. 
Then we ask: Is there a Nash equilibrium x
 SN of the game G(N, SN, f) (first play) such that A x

 SN is also a Nash equilibrium of this game in second play with respect to the translated 
profiles? It raises the so called split Nash equilibrium problems for dual games. 
In [25] and [9], multitudinous of iterative algorithms have provided for the approximations of 
split Nash equilibria for two games. In all results about estimating Nash equilibria in the listed 
papers, there is a common essential prerequisite: The existence of a Nash equilibrium in the 
considered problem is assumed. It is indubitable that the existence of solutions for split Nash 
equilibrium problems is always the crux of the matter for solving these problems.  
In [6], the present author proved an existence theorem of split Nash equilibrium problems for 
related games by using the Fan-KKM Theorem. Since the present author has studied the fixed 
point theory on posets for several years and has made some applications to Nash equilibrium 
problems, so, in this paper, we will apply some fixed point theorems on posets to study the 
solvability of split Nash equilibrium problems for dual games. To this end, the profile sets of 
games must be equipped with partial orders that may be neither linear spaces, nor topological 
spaces. The positive aspect of this research is that the utility functions in the considered games 
are unnecessary to be continuous and the mapping A that defines the split Nash equilibrium 
problems is unnecessary to be linear. 
In section 3, we extend the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems for dual games to 
infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems for repeated games and prove an existence theorem. 
As applications, in section 4, we study the existence of infinitely split Nash equilibrium and 
Nash equilibrium for the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly Model of price competition that is a 
special repeated game. 
2. Split Nash equilibrium problems in dual games 
2.1. Definitions and notations for split Nash equilibrium problems in dual games 
Let G(N, SN, f) be an n-person game. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, we assume 
that, for every player i  N, his strategy set Si is nonempty and is equipped with a partial order 
i. That is, for every i  N, player i’s strategy set is assumed to be a poset (Si, i). As the product 
partially ordered set of (Si, i)’s, the profile set is also a poset (SN, ) in which the partial order  
is the component-wise partial order of i’s. That is, for x = (x1, x2, …, xn) and y = (y1, y2, …, yn) 
 SN, we have that 
                                            y  x, if and only if,  yi i xi, for all i  N.  
For every i  N, (Si, i) is similarly defined to be the product poset of (Sj, j)’s, j  i, in which 
i is the corresponding component-wise partial order of j’s, j  i.         
Definition 1.  Let G(N, SN, f, A)
2 be an n-person dual game. The split Nash equilibrium problem 
associated with this dual game, denoted by NSNE(G(N, SN, f, A)
2), is formalized as: to find a 
profile x

 SN satisfying 
                                           fi(zi, ix

)  fi( ix

, ix

), for every i  N and z  S,                                (7) 
such that the profile A x

 SN solves the following  
                              fi((Az)i, ixA )(

)  fi( ixA )(

, ixA )(

), for every i  N and z  S.                    (8) 
From (6), a profile x

 SN satisfying (78) can be rewritten as: 
                                                F(z, x

) n F( x , x ) = f( x ), for all z  SN,                                       (9) 
and 
                                          F(Az, A x

) n F(A x ,A x ) = f( x ), for all z  SN.                                 (10) 
Such a profile x

in SN is called a split Nash equilibrium of this split Nash equilibrium problem 
NSNE(G(N, SN, f, A)
2).  The set of all split Nash equilibriums is denoted by (G(N, SN, f, A)2). 
When looking at the equilibrium problems (5) and (6) separately, the problem (5) is the classical 
Nash equilibriums problem of strategic games. When, considering a special case, A = I (A is 
unnecessary to be linear), that is the identity mapping on SN, NSNE(G(N, SN, f, I)
2) reduces to the 
classical Nash equilibrium problem for the game G(N, SN, f). In this view, split Nash equilibrium 
problems for dual games can be considered as the natural extensions of the classical Nash 
equilibrium problems. 
A fixed point theorem on posets is proved in [8]. In this theorem, the underlying space is a chain-
complete poset and the considered mapping is just required to satisfy order-increasing upward 
condition without any continuity condition (As a matter of fact, the underlying space is just 
equipped with a partial order and it may not have any topological structure). The values of the 
considered mapping are universally inductive that is a relatively broad concept. Some properties 
and examples of universally inductive posets have been provided in [8]. We recall this theorem 
below that will be used in the proof of the main theorems in this paper.  
Fixed Point Theorem A (Theorem 3.2 in [8]). Let (P, P) be a chain-complete poset and let  
: P  2P\{} be a set-valued mapping satisfying the following three conditions: 
         A1.   is P-increasing upward;  
         A2.  ((x), P) is universally inductive, for every x  P;  
         A3.  There is an element y* in P and v*  (y*) with y* P v*. 
Let () denote the set of fixed points of . Then 
(i) ((), P) is a nonempty inductive poset; 
(ii) (()[y*), P) is a nonempty inductive poset; and  has an P-maximal fixed point  
x* with x*P y*. 
2.2 An existence theorem for split Nash equilibrium in dual games 
We need the following concept, order-positive, for mappings from posets to posets. It is an 
important condition for the mapping A for the existence of split Nash equilibrium in split Nash 
equilibrium problems.   
Definition 2. Let (X, X), (Y, Y) and (U, U) be posets.  Let C, D be nonempty subsets of X and 
Y, respectively. A mapping g: XY U is said to be order-positive from XY to U whenever, for 
x, y  D, if x Y y, then 
                              g(z, x) U g(t, x)     implies    g(z, y) U g(t, y),  for any z, t  X.                 (11) 
In particular, if (U, U) = (Rm, m), where m is a natural number, a mapping g is order-positive 
from XY to (Rm, m) whenever, for x, y  C, if x X y, then 
                                g(z, x) m g(t, x)    implies    g(z, y) m g(t, y),  for any z, t  X.                (12) 
Let G(N, SN, f, A)
2 be an n-person dual game. To prove an existence theorem for split Nash 
equilibrium problem NSNE(G(N, SN, f, A)
2), we need to define a mapping : SN  NS2 , for x  
SN, by 
                    (x) ={t  SN: F(z, x) n F(t, x) and F(Az, Ax) n F(At, Ax), for all z  SN}.       (13)                   
 can be equivalently written, for x  SN, as 
                     (x) ={t  SN: fi(zi, xi)  fi(ti, xi) and fi((Az)i, (Ax)i)  fi((At)i, (Ax)i),  
                                             for every i  N and for all z  SN}.                                                 
Observation 1. In Theorem 1 given below, it is assumed that, for every x  SN, (x)  . It 
means that, for any given profile x  SN and for every player i  N, when player i’s opponents 
take xi to play, there exists a strategy ti  Si such that player i will optimize his utility at the 
profile (ti, xi). Hence, the condition that (x) is nonempty is a reasonable condition and it should 
not be too strong.  
Now we prove one of the main theorems of this paper. 
Theorem 1. Let G(N, SN, f, A)
2 be an n-person dual game. Suppose that, for every i  N, (Si, i) 
is a nonempty chain-complete poset. Let (SN, ) be the product poset of (Si, i)’s equipped with 
the component-wise partial order . If f and A satisfy the following conditions: 
         a).  For every i  N, fi is order-positive from (Si, i)(Si, i) to (R, ); 
         b).  For every x  SN, (x) is a universally inductive subset of SN; 
         c).  The operator A: SN  SN is -increasing; 
         d).  There are elements x  SN and u  (x) satisfying x  u, 
then the dual game G(N, SN, f, A)
2 has a split Nash equilibrium. Moreover 
(i) ((G(N, SN, f, A)2), ) is a nonempty inductive poset; 
(ii) ((G(N, SN, f, A)2)[x), ) is a nonempty inductive poset.  
Proof. Since, for every i  N, (Si, i) is a nonempty chain-complete poset, then the profile set, as 
a product space of chain-complete spaces (Si, i)’s, (SN , ) is a nonempty chain-complete poset, 
where  is the component-wise partial order of i’s. Define a set-valued mapping : SN  NS2 by 
(x) = (x)  
            ={t  SN: F(z, x) n F(t, x) and F(Az, Ax) n F(At, Ax), for all z  SN}, for x  SN.       (14)   
From condition b) in this theorem, it implies that, for every x  SN, (x)  . Hence the mapping 
: SN  NS2 \{} is a well-defined set-valued mapping with universally inductive values in SN.  
Next we show that  is -increasing upward. Notice that the partial order  on SN is the 
component-wise partial order of i’s on Si’s, respectively. It implies that, for any x, y  SN, x  y 
is equivalent to xi i yi and xi i yi, for every i  N,  From condition a), for every i  N, fi is 
order-positive from (Si, i)(Si, i) to (R, ). From (3), it implies that F is order-positive from  
(SN, )(SN, ) to (Rn, n). Then, for arbitrary x, y  SN with x  y, it implies xi i yi, every i 
 N. From condition a), we then have 
                                      fi(zi, xi)  fi(ti, xi)   fi(zi, yi)  fi(ti, yi),  for zi, ti  Si. 
It follows that 
                                 F(z, x) n F(t, x)    implies    F(z, y) n F(t, y),  for any z, t  SN.             (15) 
From condition c), the operator A: SN  SN is -increasing. It implies that if x  y, then, Ax  Ay. 
From condition a) again, similar to (15), we have  
                       F(Az, Ax) n F(At, Ax)    implies     F(Az, Ay) n F(At, Ay), for any z, t  SN.   (16)                                 
 (15) and (16) together imply that if x  y, then (x)  (y). Hence  is -increasing upward. 
The elements x  SN and u  (x) given in condition d) in this theorem satisfy that u  (x) 
such that x  u. So  satisfies all conditions in the Fixed Point Theorem A. It follows that () 
  and it satisfies the properties (i) and (ii) in Theorem A. From (9) and (10), the definition of 
(G(N, SN, f, A)2), and (14), the definition of , we obtain 
                                                         (G(N, SN, f, A)2) = ().                                                  (17) 
By Applying Theorem A and (17), the proof of this theorem is completed immediately.                                                                                                                     
     2.3. Applications to partially ordered Banach spaces. 
In this subsection, we consider a special case of n-person dual games in which the strategy set for 
every player is a nonempty and compact subset of a partially ordered Banach space. This case 
should be very useful in the applications. In [8], it was proved that every partially ordered 
compact Hausdorff topological space is both chain-complete and universally inductive, as a 
consequence of Theorem 1, we have 
Corollary 1. Let G(N, SN, f, A)
2 be an n-person dual game. Suppose that, for every i  N, Si is a 
nonempty compact subset of a partially ordered Banach space (Bi, i). Let BN = iN Bi equipped 
with the component-wise partial order  of i’s. If f and A satisfy the following conditions: 
         a).  For every i  N, fi is order-positive from (Si, i)(Si, i) to (R, ); 
         b).  For every x  SN, (x) is a nonempty closed subset of SN; 
         c).  The operator A: SN  SN is -increasing; 
         d).  There are elements x  SN and u  (x) satisfying x  u, 
then the dual game G(N, SN, f, A)
2 has a split Nash equilibrium. Moreover, (G(N, SN, f, A)2) has 
the properties (i) and (ii) listed in Theorem 1. 
Remarks 2. In Corollary 1, even though the profile set in the dual game G(N, SN, f, A)
2 is a 
subset of a Banach space, the operator A: SN  SN is not required to be linear. It may be a 
nonlinear operator.    
3. Infinitely Split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games 
3.1. Definitions and notations of n-person repeated games 
Let G(N, SN, f) be an n-person game. Recall that, for every i  N, player i’s strategy set is 
assumed to be a poset (Si, i). (SN, ) is the product poset, where  is the component-wise partial 
order of i’s naturally equipped on SN.   
For every natural number k, after the players repeated play the game k times and, for each time, 
the game is played as a static n-person simultaneous-move game, before they play this static 
game again, every player always considers the reaction of its competitors to its strategy applied 
in the previous time. To optimize their utilities, the players may make arrangements of strategies 
to use in the next play (the (k +1)th play). Suppose that the profile of the arranged strategies is 
represented by the value of a mapping Ak: SN  SN, for k = 1, 2, 3, … (Since (Si, i) is just a 
poset, it may not be equipped with any algebraic structure. So the linearity of Ak is may not be 
defined). To summarizing this process, if x  SN is the profile used by the players in the first 
time, then A1x  SN will be the profile used by the players in the second time; A2A1x  SN will be 
the profile used by the players in the third time. Hence, for k = 1, 2, 3, …, Ak …A2A1x  SN will 
be the profile used by the players in the (k +1)th play. For simplicity, we write  
                                                      k = Ak Ak1 …A1A0, for k = 0, 1, 2, ….                               (18)  
where A0 = I, that is the identity operator on SN. Then k: SN  SN is a single-valued mapping. In 
particular, if  Ak = Ak1 = …= A1 = A, then we denote                                                       
                                                               k = AkA0, for k = 1, 2, ….                                                      
Suppose that the utilities of this game are bounded. That is, there is a number M > 0 such that 
   (M)                                    fi(x)  M,  for every i  N and for all x  SN. 
There is a discount factor 0 <  < 1. For every i  N, player i’s discounted value of utility at a 
profile x  SN is 
                                                           hi(x) = 



0
)(
k
ki
k xf ,                                                           (19) 
Player i’s discounted value of utility at the profile x associated with a profile z  SN is 
                                                   Hi(z, x) = 



0
))(,)((
k
ikiki
k xzf .                                           (20) 
It implies 
                                              Hi(x, x) = hi(x), for every i  N and for all x  SN.          
The utility vector with discounted values for this repeated game at the profile x associated with a 
profile z  SN is 
                                       H(z, x) = iN Hi(z, x) = iN (



0
))(,)((
k
ikiki
k xzf ).                     
Under the boundedness condition (M), for every i  N, both of hi and Hi are well-defined real 
valued functions on SN and SN SN, respectively. Then it forms an n-person dynamic model based 
on an n-person game. It is called an n-person repeated game based on the n-person static game 
G(N, SN, f) and is denoted by 
                                                              0),,,( kkN AfSNG . 
Definition 3.  Let 0),,,( kkN AfSNG be an n-person repeated game. A profile xˆ  SN is called a 
Nash equilibrium of this repeated game, if the following inequalities are satisfied 
                                            Hi(z, xˆ )  Hi( xˆ , xˆ ), for every i  N and z  SN.                          (21) 
Definition 4. The infinitely split Nash equilibrium problem associated with the repeated game 

0),,,( kkN AfSNG , denoted by NSNE(

0),,,( kkN AfSNG ), is formalized as: to find a profile x

 
SN satisfying 
        fi((kz)i, ik x  )(

)  fi( ik x)(

 , ik x  )(

), for every i  N and z  SN, for k = 0, 1, 2, … .    (22) 
Such a profile x

 SN is called an infinitely split Nash equilibrium. The set of all infinitely split 
Nash equilibriums of 0),,,( kkN AfSNG is denoted by (

0),,,( kkN AfSNG ). 
Proposition 1. Every infinitely split Nash equilibrium of an n-person repeated game is a Nash 
equilibrium of this repeated game. 
Proof. Suppose that, for every i  N, for k = 0, 1, 2, … , the following inequality holds 
                                            fi((kz)i, ik x  )(

)  fi( ik x)(

 , ik x  )(

), for all z  SN.  
Since 0 <  < 1, it implies    
                   Hi(z, x

) = 



0
))(,)((
k
ikiki
k xzf

   



0
))(,)((
k
ikiki
k xxf

  = Hi( x

, x

).                                              
It completes the proof of this proposition.                                                                                      
Similar to (13) for the definition of the mapping , regarding to 0),,,( kkN AfSNG , we need to 
define a mapping : SN  NS2 , for x  SN, by 
   (x) ={t  SN: fi((kz)i, ik x  )( )  fi( ikt)( , ik x  )( ), for every i  N, all zi  Si, all k = 0, 1, …}                                  
 can be rewritten, for x  SN, as 
                (x) ={t  SN: F(kz, kx) n F(kt, kx), for k = 0, 1, 2, … and for all z  SN}.     (23)                 
Theorem 2. Let 0),,,( kkN AfSNG be an n-person repeated game. Suppose that, for every i  N, 
(Si, i) is a nonempty chain-complete poset. Let (SN, ) be the product poset of (Si, i)’s 
equipped with the component-wise partial order . Suppose that the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
         a).  For every i  N, fi is order-positive from (Si, i)(Si, i) to (R, ); 
         b).  For every x  SN, (x) is a nonempty universally inductive subset of SN; 
         c).  For every k = 1, 2, …, Ak: SN  SN is an -increasing operator; 
         d).  There are elements x  SN and u  (x) satisfying x  u. 
Then the repeated game 0),,,( kkN AfSNG has an infinitely split Nash equilibrium. Moreover 
(i) (( 0),,,( kkN AfSNG ), ) is a nonempty inductive poset; 
(ii) (( 0),,,( kkN AfSNG )[x), ) is a nonempty inductive poset.  
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. As a product space of 
chain-complete posets (Si, i)’s, the profile set (SN , ) is also a nonempty chain-complete poset, 
where  is the component-wise partial orders i’s. By using (23), we define a set-valued 
mapping : SN  NS2 , for x  SN, by 
    (x) = (x) ={t  SN: F(kz, kx) n F(kt, kx), for k = 0, 1, 2, … and for all z  SN}.     (24)                 
From (3) and (24), (x) can be rewritten as 
(x) = (x)  
        ={t  SN: fi((kz)i, ik x  )( )  fi( ikt)( , ik x  )( ), for every i  N, all zi  Si, all k = 0, 1, …}                                  
From condition b) in this theorem, the mapping : SN  NS2 \{} is a well-defined set-valued 
mapping with universally inductive values in SN. Next we show that  is -increasing upward. 
From condition a), for every i  N, fi is order-positive from (Si, i)(Si, i) to (R, ). From 
condition c), it implies that, for every k = 0, 1, 2, … k: SN  SN is -increasing. Then, for 
arbitrary x, y  SN with x  y, similarly to (15) and (16), we can show that 
  F(kz, kx) n F(kt, kx)   F(kz, ky) n F(kt, ky), for any z, t  SN, k = 0, 1, …. (25)                                        
 (25) implies that if x  y, then (x)  (y). Hence  is -increasing upward. The elements x  
SN and u  (x) given in condition d) in this theorem implies that u  (x) with x  u. So  
satisfies all conditions of Fixed Point Theorem A. Rest of the proof is the same to the proof of 
Theorem 1.                                                                                                                                  
Similar to Corollary 1, as an application of Theorem 2 to partially ordered Banach spaces, we 
have  
Corollary 2. Let 0),,,( kkN AfSNG be an n-person repeated game. Suppose that, for every i  N, 
Si is a nonempty compact subset of a partially ordered Banach space (Bi, i). Let (BN, ) be the 
product partially ordered Banach space of (Bi, i)’s, where  is the component-wise partial 
order of i’s. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied: 
         a).  For every i  N, fi is order-positive from (Si, i)(Si, i) to (R, ); 
         b).  For every x  SN, (x) is a nonempty closed subset of SN; 
         c).  For every k = 1, 2, …, Ak: SN  SN is an -increasing operator, 
         d).  There are elements x  SN and u  (x) satisfying x  u. 
Then the repeated game 0),,,( kkN AfSNG has an infinitely split Nash equilibrium. Moreover 
( 0),,,( kkN AfSNG ) has the properties (i) and (ii) given in Theorem 2. 
By using Proposition 1, as applications of Theorem 2, or in Corollary 2, we obtain the following 
existence results about Nash equilibrium of n-person repeated games. 
Corollary 3. Let 0),,,( kkN AfSNG be an n-person repeated game as given in Theorem 2 (or in 
Corollary 2). If conditions a)-d) listed in Theorem 2 (or in Corollary 2) are satisfied, then this 
repeated game has a Nash equilibrium. 
Remarks 2. Theorems 1, 2 and Corollary 1, 2, 3 provide some conditions for the existence of 
infinitely split Nash equilibrium or Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Notice that these 
conditions are just necessary conditions and are not sufficient conditions. Hence, if the 
conditions of these existence results do not hold for some repeated games, there still may exist an 
infinitely split Nash equilibrium. It only means that it cannot be assured that there is one, if these 
conditions are not satisfied.  
4. Applications to repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition 
 
In [6], the present author generalized the Bertrant duopoly model of price competition with two 
firms from the same price model (see [10]) to the model with possibly different prices. Then the 
dual extended Bertrant model is introduced and an existence theorem of split Nash equilibrium 
for the Markov dual extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition is proved in [6]. We 
review this duopoly model below. 
 
The extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition is a model of oligopolistic 
competition that deals with two profit-maximizing firms, named by 1 and 2, in a market. In this 
model, it is assumed that the two firms have constant returns to scale technologies with costs c1 > 
0 and c2 > 0, per unit produced, respectively, where the costs c1 and c2 are possibly different. 
Without loss of the generality, we assume  
                                                                       c1  c2,                                                                  (26) 
 
The inequality (26) means that the qualities of the products by these two firms may be different. 
More precisely, the quality of the products in firm 1 may not be as good as the quality of the 
products in firm 2.  
Let pj be the price of the products by firm j, for j = 1, 2.  Let (p1, p2) be the demand function in 
this duopoly market. Let j(p1, p2) be the sale function for firm j, for j = 1, 2. f and j are assumed 
to be continuous functions of two variables and strictly decreasing with respect to every given 
variable. Suppose that there are positive numbers 
jp , for j = 1, 2, such that, for all pk 
 
                          j(pj, pk)  0, for all pj  [0, jp )  and   j(pj, pk) = 0, for all pj  jp .               (27) 
Suppose that the socially optimal (competitive) output level in this market is strictly positive and 
finite for every firm  
                                                                  0 < (c1, c2) < . 
For given prices p1, p2, set by firms 1 and 2, respectively, the market is assumed to be clear. That 
is, 
                                                    (p1, p2) = 1(p1, p2) + 2(p1, p2).                                             
Let  = ,/ 21 cc that defines the ratio of the qualities of the products by firm 1 to firm 2. From the 
assumption (17), we have   (0, 1]. Considered as a noncooperative strategic game, the 
competition takes place as follows: The two firms simultaneously name their prices p1, p2, 
respectively. The sales 1(p1, p2) and 2(p1, p2) are then satisfied  
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and  
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We assume that the firms produce to order and so they incur production costs only for an output 
level equal to their actual sales. Therefore, for given prices p1, p2, the firm j has profits 
                                                  uj(p1, p2) = (pj  cj)j(p1, p2), for j = 1, 2.                                  (30) 
In [6], an existence theorem for Nash equilibrium of the extended Bertrant duopoly model is 
proved. We recalled it below for easy reference.    
Theorem 6.1 in [6]. In the extended Bertrant duopoly Model, there is a unique Nash equilibrium 
)ˆ,ˆ( 21 pp . In this equilibrium, both firms set their prices equal to their costs, respectively: 1pˆ = c1, 
2pˆ = c2. 
This extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition with two firms is a 2-person static 
game. It is denoted by G(N, SN, u), where N = {1, 2}, Sj  [0, jp ], u = (u1, u2), and uj is defined 
by (30), for j = 1, 2, respectively.  
For every natural number k, after the two firms repeated play the game k times and, for each 
time, the game is played as a static 2-person simultaneous-move game and before they name 
their prices to play again, every firm always considers the reaction of its competitor to its 
strategy (price) applied in the previous time. Suppose that when this game is played in the kth 
time, the two firms names their prices as 
1k
jp , for j = 1, 2, respectively. To optimize their 
utilities, for example, firm 1 could try to increase its profits by increasing the price from
1
1
kp  to
kp1 (never excess
1
2
kp ), even though decreasing its sales. Meanwhile, firm 2 could try to increase 
its profits by decreasing the price from 
1
2
kp  to kp2 (never lower than
1
1
kp ) for increasing its sales. 
Suppose that such performance is defined by a linear transformation Ak from  1211 ,  kk pp  to
 kk pp 21 , . Here we assume 01p = p1, and 02p = p2, that are the prices set by the two firms in the very 
first time. So, for k = 1, 2, …, there is a 22 matrix Mk:                                                                              
                                                             Mk = 
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kk
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
1
1
,                                                 (31) 
where 0  k,  k  1, such that  
                              (
kp1 ,
kp2 ) = Ak ((
1
1
kp , 12
kp )) = 







kk
kk


1
1
(
1
1
kp , 12
kp ).                       (32)                                                   
It implies  
                                          0  11
kp  kp1   and  0 
kp2  
1
2
kp , for k = 1, 2, … .                        (33) 
Hence the process of repeatedly playing the static game G(N, SN, u) with the sequence of linear 
transformations 0}{ kkA defined by (32) is a dynamic game, that is the repeated extended Bertrant 
duopoly model of price competition. It is a special repeated game denoted by 0),,,( kkN AuSNG .  
From Definition 4, p

= ),( 11 pp

 SN is an infinitely split Nash equilibriums of the repeated game 

0),,,( kkN AuSNG , if it satisfies 
  ui((kp)i, ik p  )(

)  ui( ik p)(

 , ik p  )(

), for every i = 1, 2, all p  SN, every k = 0, 1, 2, …. (34) 
Theorem 3. For the infinitely split Nash equilibrium problem of the repeated extended Bertrant 
duopoly model 0),,,( kkN AuSNG , we have 
(i) If c1 = c2 = c, then, for any sequence of linear transformations 

0}{ kkA defined in (32), 
p

= ),( 11 pp

= (c, c) is the unique infinitely split Nash equilibrium;  
 
(ii) If c1 < c2, then there exists a unique infinitely split Nash equilibrium p

= ),( 11 pp

=  
(c1, c2), only if all linear transformations Ak’s equal to the identity, that is    
 
                                        Ak = 





10
01
, for k = 0, 1, 2, … .                                      (35)   
Proof. Part (i) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6.1 in [6]. To prove part (ii), notice that 
every infinitely split Nash equilibrium of the repeated game 0),,,( kkN AuSNG  is a split Nash 
equilibrium of the dual game 21),,,( AuSNG N studied in [6]. From Theorem 6.2 in [6], ),( 11 pp

= 
(c1, c2) is the unique split Nash equilibrium of the dual game
2
1),,,( AuSNG N , only if 
                                                                      A1 = 





10
01
. 
It implies 2  = A2. Applying Theorem 6.1 in [6] again, it follows that ),( 11 pp

= (c1, c2) is the 
unique split Nash equilibrium of the triple game 32),,,,( AIuSNG N , only if 
                                                                       A2 = 





10
01
. 
Then (35) is proved by induction.                                                                                                         
Since 1 and 2 are continuous functions, from the condition (27) and the definition (30) of the 
utility functions, it implies that there exists M > 0, such that 
   (M)                                    ui(p)  M,  for i = 1, 2 and for all p  SN. 
Let  be the discount factor of this dynamic game. By Proposition 1, as a consequence of 
Theorem 3, we have 
Corollary 4. In the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model 0),,,( kkN AuSNG , there is a 
Nash equilibrium ),( 11 pp

= (c1, c2) at which, every firm has zero discounted value of utility, i.e.  
                             ),( 11 pphi

=   



0
11,
k
ki
k ppu

  =  

0
21,
k
i
k ccu  = 0,   for i = 1, 2.                                                            
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